Riots Reveal Organized Crime Power in Brazil

Last weekend, Brazilians living in the greater Saoand civilians that the security sector here has a long
Paulo metropolitan area witnessed one of theway to go before it has any significant control over
country's largest prison riots in the past five years,organized crime. These rebellions also highlight the
organized and orchestrated by Sao Paulo's largestsuperior communication networks operated by
criminal faction, the First Capital Command (PCC inBrazilian organized crime. Communication is
Portuguese).When Sao Paulo state authoritiesfundamental When Fernandinho Beira-Mar was
transferred some 756 PCC leaders, the PCC criminaltransferred from his prison cell in Rio de Janeiro after
enterprise, led by Willians Herbas Camacho (a.k.a.he orchestrated a prison riot there in September
Marcola), implemented its plan to start riots in dozens2002 to mask the assassination of rival gang leaders,
of prisons in Sao Paulo and around the country. Theyauthorities found a number of luxury items including
took advantage of the unusually lax securitysilk pajamas. But what surprised them more was the
environment over the weekend when some 10,000number of abandoned cell phones. Reports from Rio
prisoners were given a day pass to visit families onde Janeiro daily, O Globo, claim that Beira-Mar used
the outside for Mother's Day, and thousands moreup to a dozen cell phones to communicate with
civilians entered prisons to visit inmates on thelieutenants and other subordinates in his black market
inside.As one prison after another fell under thenetwork of guns and drugs shipments and sales.In a
control of rioting inmates, the hostage countsimilar fashion, leaders of the PCC use cell phones to
rocketed into the hundreds. Meanwhile, organizedcommunicate with one another between prisons and
attacks on police stations around Sao Paulo keptbetween prisoners and gang members on the
security forces busy defending themselves. At theoutside. Both the Civil Police and the Federal Police
same time, masked gunmen commandeered cityoperate listening posts, which enable security officials
buses, ordering them evacuated before burning themto piece together actionable intelligence on plans for
to the ground.The weekend's total included over 250rebellions and other gang operations. However, the
separate attacks on police stations, stores, and otheruse of two-way radios has made that task much
establishments. There were 115 people killed, includingmore difficult.In both Rio and Sao Paulo, two-way
32 policemen and prison guards and 71 gangradios are used by criminals to relay messages to
members. Another 49 people were injured. Some 215other incarcerated gang members and members on
hostages were taken in 73 prison riots that occurredthe outside. In some cases, one prisoner calls via cell
in prisons across Sao Paulo, Parana, Matto Grosso doa subordinate on the outside who uses a two-way
Sul, Brasilia, and Bahia, according to Brazilian daily Folharadio to transmit the message to a third individual
de Sao Paulo. Over 80 public transport buses werewho then uses another cell phone to pass along the
burned and one metro station was attacked, leavingmessage to its recipient in another prison, reports O
over five million people without public transport. On 15Globo. Each node on the communications chain may
May, as millions of people fled home in the earlyuse any number of cell phones or two-way radios,
afternoon, Sao Paulo became a city of gridlockmaking tracking the signals very difficult.Attempts to
spanning 203 kilometers of roadways.Over theblock cell phone signals in Rio and Sao Paulo have
weekend, as the violence raged on, Brazilian Justicebeen ineffective.In the middle of the Mother's Day
Minister Marcio Thomas Bastos offered the serviceweekend riots, requests to shut down cell phone
of 4,000 soldiers, part of a National Force trained totowers used by criminals to relay signals were
help contain the security problems in Brazilian states.presented to Brazil's telecommunications regulatory
But Sao Paulo Governor Claudio Lembo, filling in forbody when Marco Antonio Desgualdo, the head of
presidential candidate Geraldo Alckmin, refused tothe Sao Paulo state Civil Police, met with this body,
accept federal help. Bastos made the trip from Brasiliacalled Anatel, on 15 May. The Folha de Sao Paulo
to Sao Paulo to again offer federal assistance duringreported that after the meeting Desgualdo
a close-door meeting on Monday, 15 May. But again itannounced that authorities would not be able to shut
was refused.By 16 May, as quickly as the violencedown cell towers without the acquiescence of
had started, it ended, and most prisons were back intelecommunications companies.These same
the control of state authorities, and policemen werecompanies - Vivo, Tim, Telefonica, Embratel, and
no longer the target of random attacks. The SaoNextel - complain that shutting down the towers
Paulo daily newspaper, O Estado de Sao Paulo,would mean an unacceptable disruption of service for
reported on 16 May that the state government hadtheir law-abiding clients. Nothing short of a court order
reached an agreement with the PCC. Governmentwould shut down the towers, a legal instrument that
officials continue to deny that claim, but it is possibletakes too long to obtain.In some prison systems, cell
such negotiations were a last-resort option for statephone signal blockers are used, but they are quickly
officials clearly caught off guard by a highly organizedrendered obsolete by the rapid pace of technological
criminal network, one many believed had beenadvancement in cell phone systems.The battle
dismantled years ago. Brazilian organized crime Thebetween Sao Paulo authorities and the cell phone
PCC began to take shape in 1993, when prisonerscompanies to shut down towers in the event of
incarcerated in Taubate state prison in Sao Paulosecurity needs began in February 2001, when PCC
organized themselves to fight against deplorable livingmembers used cell phones to orchestrate
conditions and more rights within the prison system.simultaneous riots in 29 prisons across Sao Paulo.
Over the past 13 years, this organization has grownSecurity officials failed to win the battle then, too,
into one of the country's most powerful prisonbut no one knew that such decisions five years ago
criminal networks, controlling activity within dozens ofwould eventually facilitate the most violent uprising of
prisons in Sao Paulo and around the country, as wellBrazilian organized crime in years. Corruption and
as important sales points and transport routes forpolitics Even as blocking cell signals and other
drugs and guns flowing into Brazil from sourcemethods to impede communication between criminals
countries such as Paraguay, Bolivia, Colombia, andevolves into what may become a viable solution,
Suriname.The PCC became more active outsidemany believe that such time is wasted on treating a
prisons in 1999, when Rio's top criminal organization -problem that is not central to the real reason why
the Red Command (CV in Portuguese) - formed anthe PCC was able to orchestrate such a widespread
alliance with PCC members who lived in Heliopolis, areign of disorder and rebellion. Corruption and politics,
shantytown located in the southeastern zone of Saotwo of the usual suspects behind systemic
Paulo, according to a Rio de Janeiro Federal Policedysfunction in democracies, are at the center of
officer who asked to remain anonymous. ThroughBrazil's security problems.Bribes paid to security
this alliance, the CV sought to shift some of its drugofficials at all levels keep leaders of the PCC and the
trafficking activities from Rio de Janeiro to Sao Paulo.CV well informed of official planning. When authorities
In Rio, CV leaders had been constantly harassed byplanned to move over 700 of the PCC leaders to a
police who exacted an extortion tax for allowingmore secure prison environment to avoid what they
favelas (shantytowns) to be used as drug saleslearned was a planned Mother's Day rebellion, the
centers and contraband transshipment points.PCC reacted by launching its rebellion two days early,
Additionally, the PCC in 1999 was a large criminaldisrupting the prisoner transport and a host of other
organization with more manpower than economicactivities planned to prevent the rebellion.Low salaries
activity. Its alliance with the CV increased earningsexacerbate corruption because policemen and some
for the PCC in Sao Paulo, while opening a new poollower-ranking members of the military are more likely
of man power for the CV to defend its turf fromto sell weapons from poorly organized stock piles to
rival gangs in Rio de Janeiro.Together, the two gangsmake ends meet. Over 70 per cent of the weapons
control the drug trade in Brazil's two largest cities.used by Brazilian organized crime were made in Brazil.
They operate gun smuggling routes out of ParaguayMany of them are sold to Paraguay where they
and purchase weapons from corrupt policemen andenter the black market before returning to Brazil. Yet
military soldiers in Sao Paulo and Rio. High-levela significant amount are sold to criminals directly from
members of these gangs, especially the CV, continuestockpiles of seized weapons.When budgets must be
to conduct a weapons-for-cocaine barter withprepared, politics dictate who gets what slice of the
members of the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forcespie. From 2004 to 2005, the Brazilian federal
of Colombia (FARC) based in the Colombiangovernment reduced resources for the country's
Amazon.As recently as 30 April, three ColombiansPenitentiary Fund by 37 per cent. This fund oversees
opened fire on a Brazilian patrol on the Rio Negro, athe overall improvement and maintenance of Brazil's
branch of the Amazon river that begins in an area ofprison system. Meanwhile, the government of Sao
the Colombian Amazon reportedly controlled by thePaulo state diverted from public security spending
FARC. Brazilian authorities claim that the rifles weresome US$81.3 million in the last five years. It was a
stamped with the Brazilian military coat of arms. Thedecision in the reduction of security spending at the
men were followed to the Colombian city of SanSao Paulo state level that was likely made after the
Felipe, where their arms were confiscated. Brazilian2001 prison riots in that state.Commenting on the
Federal Police investigators told ISN Security Watchevent, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio "Lula"
that they believe the arms were part of a cache ofda Silva said it was a demonstration of the power of
weapons to be traded for cocaine that traffickersorganized crime in Brazil. His comments underline the
would transport to Sao Paulo and Rio.Red Commandfact that Brazilian organized crime is a force that has
leader Fernandinho Beira-Mar is considered to havegrown to threaten Brazilian cities as well as the
been one of the first Brazilian criminals to tradenation. With links to organized crime in Paraguay and
weapons for cocaine with the FARC. He wasSuriname, and a thriving barter system with
arrested by Colombian authorities in April 2001 andColombia's FARC soldiers, the PCC and CV may soon
immediately extradited to Brazil. Yet the recentbecome internationally known as a criminal network
incident on the Brazilian-Colombian border in thethat has grown too big for Brazil's security system to
Amazon indicates that five years later, this criminalhandle.Sam Logan ( is an investigative journalist who
exchange program still continues to supply the CVhas reported on security, energy, politics, economics,
and the PCC with pure, Colombian cocaine.Brazilianorganized crime, terrorism, and black markets in Latin
organized crime is just as powerful within the prisonAmerica since 1999. He is currently completing his
system as it is on the outside. And as the battlework on Nice Guys Die First, a forthcoming
continues to dismantle these criminal networks, thenon-fiction narrative about organized crime in Brazil.
occasional mega-rebellion reminds Brazilian authorities